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ABSTRACT 
A Gaussian belief function can be intuitic'ely described as a Gaussian distribution 
ot~er a hyperplane, whose parallel subhyperplanes are the focal elements'. This paper 
elaborates on the idea of Dempster and Sharer and formally represents a Gaussian 
belief function as a wide-sense inner product and a linear functional ouer a variable 
space, and as their duals" ot:er a hyperplane in a sample space. By adapting Dempster's 
rule to the continuous case, it derices a rule of combination and proves its equivalence 
to its geometric description by Dempster. It illustrates by examples how mixed knowl- 
edge int.'olcing linear equations, multicariate Gaussian distributions, and partial igno- 
rance can be represented and combined as Gaussian belief unctions. 
KEYWORDS: expert systems, Dempster-Shafer theory, belief networks, 
knowledge r presentation, multivariate Gaussian distributions 
1, INTRODUCTION 
The notion of Gaussian belief functions (GBFs) extends Dempster- 
Shafer theory in representing mixed knowledge, some of which is logical, 
some uncertain, and some vacuous. Logical knowledge is represented by a 
hyperplane in a sample space. Ignorance is represented by partitioning the 
hyperplane into parallel subhyperplanes as focal elements. Uncertain 
knowledge is then represented by a Gaussian distribution across the focal 
elements over the hyperplane. In its full generality, a GBF can be intu- 
itively described as a Gaussian distribution across the parallel members of 
a partition of a hyperplane. It includes as special cases nonprobabilistic 
linear equations, statistical observations, multivariate Gaussian distribu- 
tions over a hyperplane, and vacuous belief functions. In terms of graphi- 
cal models (Kong, 1986), a general GBF can be seen as the combination of 
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its special cases, whose individual representation is often trivial. However, 
to represent a GBF in its full generality, advanced notions such as linear 
functionals and linear spaces are required. This paper elaborates on the 
idea of Dempster (1990b) and Shafer (1992) and formally represents a
GBF as a wide-sense inner product and a linear functional over a variable 
space, and as their dual over a hyperplane in a sample space. When 
variables of interest are specified, the abstract representation can be 
reduced into matrices and linear and quadratic functions, which allow 
efficient implementation of the idea of GBFs. Using examples, the paper 
shows how this can be done and how statistical models and assumptions 
can be formally represented and combined as GBFs. 
As in Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer, 1976), knowledge represented by 
GBFs has two primitive operations--marginalization and combination. 
Marginalization corresponds to the coarsening of knowledge, and combi- 
nation corresponds to the integration of knowledge. Drawing inferences 
consists of combining all the relevant information and marginalizing the 
full body of knowledge into the variables of interest. The marginalization 
of a GBF is most naturally described as a projection in a variable space. 
The combination of GBFs is geometrically described by Dempster (1990b) 
as intersecting hyperplanes and summing the restricted log "densities" in a 
sample space. To interplay these two operations, this paper adapts Demp- 
ster's rule to the continuous case and derives a rule of combination in a 
variable space. It shows that the resulting rule is equivalent to the 
geometric description in Dempster (1990b). 
In terms of representation, a GBF may be equivalently represented 
by a Bayesian model and vice versa. However, the proposal of the no- 
tion of GBFs is dictated by the best-known properties of belief-function 
model ing--the representation of ignorance by vacuous belief functions, 
the resolution of complex representations of uncertainty into components 
by graphical models, and the combination of independent models by 
Dempster's rule. As Dempster (1990b) argued, the belief-function formal- 
ism generalizes Bayesian inference of posterior distributions while aban- 
doning its most controversial component: improper priors. It extends, 
unifies, and clarifies Fisher's fiducial method of posterior easoning while 
filling the void of a prior distribution in the logical structure with a vacuous 
belief function. Also, as its geometric description suggests, a GBF treats all 
the components of a statistical model (such as observations, model as- 
sumptions, and subjective beliefs) not as separate concepts, but as manifes- 
tations of a single concept. Furthermore, the specification of a graphical 
belief-function model is based on symmetric evidential independence 
assumptions that are simpler and easier to check than asymmetric Bayesian 
conditional-probability assumptions, whose verification and falsification 
are often difficult due to human beings' limited knowledge about causality. 
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These features of GBFs allow people to concentrate their modeling efforts 
on recognizing and incorporating independent components of real infor- 
mation. 
The notion of GBFs turns out to have a wide range of real applications. 
Dempster (1990a, b) shows how the Kalman filter can be understood in 
terms of GBFs. As Dempster (1990a) shows, the state equations and the 
observation equations in the Kalman filter can be captured by logical 
belief functions. The distributional assumptions on independent random 
disturbances can be represented by Gaussian distributions. The values of 
observable variables can be represented as another set of logical belief 
functions. All three types of belief functions are specified locally in a belief 
network. The recursion involved in the filter can be regarded as a special 
case of the recursion involved in the computation of GBF marginals in a 
join tree. The full Kalman filter model results from judging all these 
components belief functions to be independent and combining them into a 
single belief function by Dempster's rule. 
Because GBFs can represent statistical models, and because Dempster's 
rule can be used to combine knowledge from independent items of 
evidence, it is clear that the theory of GBFs provides a method of 
combining independent models. Liu (1995b) implements this idea. Specifi- 
cally, information from different sources such as multiple databases is 
treated as independent i ems of evidence. The knowledge drawn from each 
database, such as a linear regression model or a belief network, is repre- 
sented by a GBF. The models from different databases are combined in 
the way we combine GBFs. Combined predictions or inferences are then 
made, based on the combined model. Obviously, this approach is consis- 
tent with the spirit of Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and 
Dempster's rule of combination. Using concrete examples, Liu (1995b) 
shows how linear models, simultaneous equations, and belief networks can 
be combined as GBFs. He also shows how this important task can be 
actually performed by simple matrix operations. The proposed method has 
a potential application in automated learning of belief networks from 
multiple databases that are neither appendable nor joinable (Maier, 1983). 
It also generalizes the metaanalysis for integrating independent statistical 
findings (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990) and the Bayesian method of estimat- 
ing common regression coefficients (Box and Tiao, 1973). As we will see 
shortly, the GBF method can combine models of different kinds that may 
involve different variables. In contrast, the models to be combined in the 
metaanalysis and the Bayesian method must be the same, and the parame- 
ters to be estimated must be common. In such a restricted case, Liu 
(1995b) shows that the GBF method is similar in flavor to metaanalysis and 
the Bayesian method. For example, for the problem of weighted means 
(Yates, 1939) and its generalization (Box and Tiao, 1973), both the GBF 
98 Liping Liu 
method and the Bayesian method give the same posterior distribution of 
common regression coefficients. 
In expert systems, the number of GBFs to be combined could be very 
large. It is inefficient and even infeasible to combine all of them first and 
then make inferences. Liu (1995a) extends existing work on finite belief 
functions (Kong, 1986; Shafer, Shenoy, and Mellouli, 1987; Shenoy and 
Shafer, 1990) and proposes a local computation scheme for GBFs. The 
basic idea is to arrange all the GBFs into a tree-structured graph, called a 
join tree, and propagate knowledge by sending and absorbing messages 
step by step in the tree. Each step of propagation involves sending a 
message from a node to a neighbor. Thus, the join-tree approach consists 
of a series of local computations, each of which involves only a small 
number of variables that are near each other in the join tree. The local 
computation scheme has been shown to work for finite belief or probability 
functions (Kong, 1986; Shenoy and Sharer, 1990; Lauritzen and Spiegelhal- 
ter, 1988). Liu (1995a) shows that it also works for GBFs by proving the 
axioms of Shenoy and Sharer (1990), which are the conditions under which 
the local computation of any objects is possible. 
An outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces 
Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and provides ome notions and 
terminology that are used throughout he paper. Section 3 first describes 
GBFs in geometric terms and then formally represent them respectively in
variable spaces and sample spaces. This section uses some advanced 
concepts uch as linear spaces and linear functionals, which are mathemat- 
ically elegant but not scientifically crucial. The nontechnical reader may 
just read the examples and geometric descriptions to make sense of GBFs. 
Section 4 derives a rule for combining GBFs in variable spaces and then 
represents it equivalently as intersections and restricted summations in 
sample spaces. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY 
The notion of belief functions can be traced to the work of Jakob 
Bernoulli on pooling pure evidence. In modern language, an item of pure 
evidence proves a claim with a certain probability but has no bearing on its 
negation. Probabilities in accordance with pure evidence are not additive. 
For example, suppose I find a scrap of newspaper predicting a blizzard 
tomorrow, which I regard as infallible. Also, suppose I am 75% certain 
that the newspaper is today's. Then, I am 75% sure of a blizzard tomorrow. 
However, if the newspaper is not today's, either blizzard or no blizzard 
could happen, since then the newspaper carriers no information on tomor- 
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row's weather. The degree of support for no blizzard is zero and for either 
blizzard or no blizzard is 25%. 
Bernoulli's idea of nonadditive probabilities has now been well devel- 
oped by Dempster (1968), Sharer (1976), and many others, under the name 
of Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. In this theory, a piece of 
evidence is encoded as a probability measure. The degree of belief for a 
claim is interpreted as a degree of the evidential support. Degrees of belief 
from independent i ems of evidence are combined by Dempster's rule of 
combination. Let X be a set of discrete variables, and X* its finite sample 
space. L Let A x denote a subset of X*, which is interpreted as the 
proposition that the true value of X is in A x. Then the degree of 
evidential support for A x is represented by m(Ax) .  The assignment of 
m(A x) is in accordance with a certain item of evidence and satisfies the 
following axioms: 
0 < m(A x)  < 1, m(O)  = O, ~{m(Ax) lA  x} = 1. (1) 
A subset A x is called a focal element iff m(A x)  > 0. Due to lack of 
evidence justifying a more specific allocation, a portion of our total belief 
allocated to a focal element A x does not necessitate the allocation of any 
partial belief to its subset. For the above newspaper example, we can 
encode the evidence by a probability measure with p(today's) = 0.75 and 
p(not today's) = 0.25. Since "today's newspaper" supports the claim "bliz- 
zard" and "not today's newspaper" supports the claim "blizzard or no 
blizzard," the degrees of evidential support can be represented as m({bliz- 
zard}) = 0.75, rn({blizzard, no blizzard}) = 0.25, and m({no blizzard}) = 0. 
Thus, {blizzard} and {blizzard, no blizzard} are the two focal elements. The 
25% of belief for {blizzard, no blizzard} does not imply any reallocation of 
the belief to its subsets {blizzard} and {no blizzard}. 
If all the focal elements are singletons, we call the belief function 
Bayesian. On the other hand, if the sample space is the only focal element, 
we call the belief function r'acuous. One advantage of the belief-function 
modeling is its ability to represent ignorance and partial ignorance. In 
Bayesian inference, complete ignorance is often represented by a uniform 
prior distribution or a prior with large scale parameters, uch as a Gauss- 
ian distribution with large variance. As Fisher consistently criticized (Fisher, 
1959; Zabell, 1989), such priors often lack theoretical or empirical bases. 
In Shafer (1976), the term "frame of discernment" instead of "sample space" is used, to 
emphasize its epistemic nature in that a sample space is deliberately constructed according to 
our knowledge and opinion. 
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They sometimes imply vanishingly small prior probability for regions of 
practical interest. The belief-function formalism represents ignorance by 
vacuous belief functions. It clearly distinguishes lack of belief from disbe- 
lief. For example, a vacuous belief function with m({rainy, not rainy}) = 1 
1 will be regarded as totally different from the one with m({rainy}) = ~ and 
m({not rainy}) - ~. 
Another advantage of the belief-function formalism is its ability to pool 
independent pieces of evidence by Dempster's rule. A piece of evidence is 
encoded as a probability measure. The pooling of two independent pieces 
of evidence can be encoded as the product of two probability measures. 
From this perspective, Dempster (1967) derived a rule for combining belief 
functions that represent independent pieces of evidence. Suppose there 
are two belief functions Bel I and Bel z respectively for sets X and Y. Their 
basic probability assignments are respectively rn l(A x) and m2(A y). Then, 
by Dempster's rule, the combined belief function, denoted by Bel i ® Bel2, 
is for set X U Y and has basic probability assignment 
m(Axu Y) = ol I ~_~{ml(Ax)m2(Ay)[ (Ax)+ r'Y ~ (Av)~ xqY 
- (Axvy)  +xnr }, (2) 
where a is a normalization constant given by 
and (Ax)*xvr  is the projection of Ax to the sample space of X N Y. 
The symbols (A y) * x n v and (A x ,0 Y) : x n r are interpreted similarly. In 
general, suppose Y is a subset of X. Then 
(Ax)  * r= {YlAx N [{y} × (X  \ Y)*] =/= O}, (3) 
where (X \ Y)* is the sample space of X \ Y. Note that (Ax)  ~x<v m 
(Ay)  ~xc'r  = O represents that the two assertions A x and A r from Bel I 
and Bel 2 are conflicting. One of them must be false, and a joint assertion 
is qualitatively impossible, c~ is the total belief committed to all the joint 
assertions that are qualitatively possible. If c~ = 0, the two belief functions 
are incombinable because they have no joint assertions qualitatively possi- 
ble. 
Combination corresponds to the integration of knowledge. Sometimes 
we are interested in drawing partial knowledge from a full body of 
knowledge. This corresponds to the coarsening of knowledge, obtained by 
the marginalization of a belief function. Suppose Bel is a belief function 
for X with basic probability assignment m(Ax) ,  and Y is a subset of X. 
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Then we define Bel + v as a belief function for Y with basic probability 
assignment m ~ v satisfying 
m¢V(Ay) = ~ {m(A x) (Ax)zv = Ay). (4) 
3. GAUSSIAN BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
Variables of interest in this paper can be classified as deterministic, such 
as observables or controllables; random, whose distribution is Gaussian; 
and vacuous, on which no knowledge bears. Based on a given body of 
evidence, a GBF in general encodes logical and probabilistic knowledge 
for all the three types of variables. Logical knowledge is represented by 
linear equations, which are in turn represented by a hyperplane in a 
sample space. Probabilistic knowledge is represented by Gaussian distribu- 
tions across all the members of a partition of the hyperplane into parallel 
subhyperplanes. Less general than an ordinary belief function, whose focal 
elements may have nonempty intersections, a GBF has the parallel subhy- 
perplanes as its mutually exclusive focal elements. Let n, n - c, and n - b 
denote the dimension numbers of  the sample space, the hyperplane, and a 
focal element, respectively. In general, c < b _< n. By appropriately setting 
one or two of the dimension numbers c, b, and n, a GBF can be 
degenerated into six nontrivial varieties, which provide building blocks for 
more complex GBFs. If b = c = 0, then the GBF is vacuous and has the 
sample place as its sole focal element. If 0 < c = b < n, then the GBF is 
equivalent o specifying c linear equations. If c = b = n, the true point in 
the sample space is known with certainty, as might occur by direct 
observation. If c = 0 and b = n, then the GBF is an ordinary Gaussian 
probability distribution in the sample space. If c > 0 and b = n, the GBF 
is a Gaussian probability distribution over the hyperplane. In the latter two 
cases, the GBF is Bayesian, because its focal elements are singletons with 
zero dimension. Finally, if 0 = c < b < n, the GBF is a proper belief 
function, which has a Gaussian distribution for some variables and no 
opinion for others. 
The above geometric description of GBFs is due to Dempster (1990b). 
In this section, we want to represent a GBF in its full generality as a 
mathematical construct and a computational object. According to Demp- 
ster (1969), if all the variables of interest span a variable space- -a  
finite-dimensional vector space whose elements are random var iables- -  
then we can consider the sample space to be its dual space, the space of all 
linear functionals on the variable space. Accordingly, a hyperplane in the 
sample space is dual to a subspace in the variable space. A wide-sense 
inner product in the sample space, which specifies the log "density" of a 
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GBF  over a hyperplane,  is dual to a wide-sense inner product  in the 
variable space, which specifies the covariance of all the variables on a 
variable subspace. F rom this dual correspondence,  nonprobabi l ist ic  l inear 
equations, which are represented by a hyperplane in the sample space, can 
be represented by a variable subspace, in which each variable takes on a 
value with certainty. We will call such a variable subspace the certainty 
space of a GBF.  A mult ivar iate Gaussian distr ibution over a hyperplane in 
the sample space can be represented by a wide-sense inner product  with 
the certainty space as its null space, which specifies the covariance be- 
tween random variables. Therefore,  we can fully descr ibe a GBF  in 
coordinate- f ree terms in both a variable space and a sample space. 
3.1. Representation in Variable Spaces 
Let V be a random-var iab le  space. A GBF  on V is a quintuplet  
(C, B, L, zr, E),  where C, B, and L are nested subspaces of V, C c B c L _c 
V, 7r is a wide-sense inner product  of B with C as its null space, and E is a 
l inear functional on B. We call C the certainty space, B the belief space, L 
the label space, ~ the covariance, and E the expectation. The expectat ion 
E and the covariance ~- define a Gaussian distr ibution for the variables in 
B by specifying their means and covariances. This Gaussian distr ibution is 
regarded as a full expression of our beliefs, based on a given body of 
evidence; this item of evidence justifies no beliefs about variables in L 
going beyond what is impl ied by the beliefs about the variables in B. (The 
evidence might justify some further beliefs about variables that are not in 
L, but these are outside the discussion so far as a bel ief function with 
space L is concerned.)  The Gaussian distr ibution assigns zero variance to 
the variables in C; if X is in C, we are certain that it takes the value E(X)  
with certainty. Let F be a subspace of B such that B = C * F. We call F 
the uncertainty space, because each variable in it has nonzero variance. 
Suppose C, B, L, and V have dimensions c, b, l, and n, respectively. 
Then we can choose a basis Xl ,  X 2 . . . . .  X n of V such that X~ . . . . .  X c is a 
basis of C, X 1 . . . . .  Xt, is a basis of  B, and X I . . . . .  X t is a basis of L. Of  
course, Xc+ ~ . . . . .  Xt, is a basis of F. For  i = 1, 2, . . . ,  b, let /x i denote the 
mean of X i. For  i , j  = 1,2 . . . . .  b -  c, let "~ij denote the covariance 
between X+i  and Xc+ j. Let /a = (/x 1 . . . . .  p,;,) and X = [52/j](b ,)×(b c)" 
Then E and 7r can be represented as follows: 
E[ (o l  I . . . . .  c%)] = (O~ 1 . . . . .  O[b)~ "1 , 
~[(  a~ . . . . .  ol~,), ( fi~ . . . . .  fit, )] = ( o~,+~ . . . . .  o~h)X ( ,e,+~ . . . . .  /3b) T, 
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where (a l  . . . . .  ~b) and (/31 . . . . .  /~b ) are two variables in B. It is easy to see 
that 7r(-,. ) is a wide-sense inner product on B with C as its null space: 
7r(S,T) =0 i f  S or T~C.  
EXAMPLE 1 Let X, Y, and Z be three variables and x, y, and z be their 
sample values. A GBF on these variables includes a Gaussian distribution 
X + X ~ N(0.5, 2) and a linear equation x + y + z = 1. Let V be spanned 
by X, Y, and Z. Let L = V. Let C be spanned by the variable X + Y + Z, 
and B by the two variables X + Y + Z and X + Y. The linear functional 
E and the wide-sense inner product 7r on B are defined as follows: 
E [%(X  + Y+Z)  + o~2(X+ Y)] = c~ l + 0.5c~2, 
7 r [a l (X  + Y + Z)  + a2(X  + Y) ,~1(X  + Y + Z)  + ¢12(X+ Y)] 
= 2 oe 2 ~2" 
Then, by verifying its variance and mean, it is easy to see that the variable 
X + Y + Z takes on the value 1 with certainty, and so C is a one-dimen- 
sional certainty space to represent the linear equation x + y + z = 1. 
Therefore, we arrive at GBF = (C, B, L, rr, E). This GBF expresses beliefs 
about each variable in B by giving its mean and variance. Suppose, for 
example, Z = (X  + Y + Z)  - (X  + Y). Then, E(Z)  = 1 - 0.5 = 0.5 and 
~r(Z, Z)  = 2( -  1 ) ( -  1) = 2. However, it has no opinion on variables in L 
that are not in B. For example, it justifies no beliefs about the variables 
X, Y, X - Y, etc. 
The reason for having the variable-space representation is partly the 
simplicity of defining marginalization, which cannot be obtained in the 
sample-space representation defined shortly. In a variable space, the 
marginalization of a GBF is simply a projection. Suppose (C, B, L, ~r, E)  is 
a Gaussian belief function, and M is a subspace of L. Then the marginal of 
(C, B, L, ~', E) on M, denoted by (C, B, L, ~-, E)  ~ M, is another GBF ob- 
tained by intersecting the certainty space C, belief space B, and label space 
L with M and restricting the covariance and the expectation to the new 
belief space: 
(C ,B ,L ,  Tr ,E)  +M = (C ¢3 M,B  n M,L  ¢3 M, Tr[~AM,E[nnM). (5) 
In Example 1, if M is spanned by Z, then C N M = 0, B C3 M = L n 
M = {aZ la  ~ JR}, 7r lBnM(aZ,  ~Z)  = 2cr13, and E IBnM(CrZ)  = 0.50:. On 
the other hand, if M is spanned by X, then C N M = 0, B n M = 0, 
L N M = M, 7rlsn M(0) = 0, and E [snn(0)  = 0. The marginal is vacuous. 
This is intuitively reasonable, because (C, B, L, 7r, E)  carries no knowledge 
about X. 
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3.2. Representation in Sample Spaces 
Let V* denote the sample space for V. The mathematical essentials are 
best conveyed by first considering V* to be the dual space of V and each 
sample point to be a linear functional on V. A Gaussian distribution on a 
hyperplane of V* can then be represented by specifying an inner product 
and a linear functional on the hyperplane. An advantage with the notion of 
linear functionals is their independence of coordinates. A linear functional 
t' over V is a real-valued function such that u(o~X + f lY )  = au(X)  + 
f lu (Y )  for all variables X and Y in V and real numbers c~ and /3. We can 
regard u(X)  as a sample value for X. Therefore, t, specifies a sample value 
for each variable in V. In particular, suppose X 1, X 2 . . . . .  X,, is a basis 
for V. Let t , (X i) =x  i for i = 1,2 . . . . .  n. Then t, specifies a vector 
(x~, x? . . . . .  x,), which is often referred to as a sample point. Because of its 
linearity, u is one-to-one correspondent to (x L, x 2 . . . . .  x,,). Therefore, we 
can treat a linear functional and a sample point interchangeably. They are 
different only in that the latter depends on a basis for V while the former 
does not. As a familiar example of linear functionals, the expectation E 
defines the mean for each variable in V. When a basis is chosen, E is 
equivalent o the mean vector /x  in V*. 
Without referring to its representation in V, a GBF can be indepen- 
dently represented in V* by specifying a hyperplane, a partition of the 
hyperplane, and a wide-sense inner product and a linear functional over 
the hyperplane. However, to see the relationship between the two repre- 
sentations, we derive a dual representation in V* for a given GBF 
(C, B, L, ~-, E). To do this, we need to choose a linear functional t on V 
that agrees with E on C - - that  is, t (X )  = E(X)  for every variable X in C. 
The functional t is allowed to disagree with E on variables in B that are 
not in C. When such a t has been chosen, we say that the GBF is marked, 
and we call t its mark. We write (C, B, L, ~-, E, t) for a marked GBF. Given 
a linear functional t, according to Dempster (1969), each subspace S in V 
has a dual hyperplane in V* that contains t: 
S* = {u]u(X) = t (X )  for all X in S}. (6) 
Therefore, C, B, and L have dual hyperplanes C*, B*, and L*, respectively. 
It is easy to see that these hyperplanes are nested: L* _c B* c C*. Accord- 
ing to the linear functional E, we can define an additional hyperplane in 
V* as follows: 
E* = {~,l~,(x) : E<X)  for all X in B}. 
It follows from E(X)  = t (X)  for all X in C that E* is contained in C* 
and parallel to B*. Since C is the certainty space, each variable X in it 
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takes on a single value E(X)  with certainty. Because c (X)  is interpreted 
as a sample value of X and E(X)  = t (X)  for all X in C, C* actually 
specifies the location of the true sample value of X in C. Therefore, C* is 
the hyperplane that represents linear equations in the GBF (C, B, L, ~-, E). 
We are certain that the true sample point must be on C*, but we do not 
know where it is exactly on C*. The hyperplane E* specifies its mean 
location. If E* is a singleton, then the expected position of the true 
sample point is specific. Otherwise, E* ranges from -~ to + ac along some 
dimensions. It means that we are completely ignorant about where the 
true sample point is along these dimensions. Therefore, E* is actually a 
focal element. Any other hyperplanes, including B*, which are parallel to 
E* are also focal elements. All the focal elements form a partition of the 
hyperplane C*. 
The above hyperplanes are better illustrated in a coordinate system. 
Choose the same basis as in Section 3.1, and represent each linear 
functional by its corresponding sample point. Then V* = {(x~ . . . . .  x , )  Ixi 
N, i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n}. Let the mark t = (/x I . . . . .  /A, t~+ ~ . . . . .  tn). Then we 
have 
C*  = {(x  I . . . . .  xn) lx  1 
B*  = {(x  1 . . . . .  xn) [x  1 
L* = {(Xl  . . . . .  xn) lx~ 
E*  = {(x  I . . . . .  x~) lx  1 
= tx I . . . . .  x ,  = txc}, 
= t Jq , . . . ,X  c = [d,c, Xc+l  = tc+l , . . . ,X  b = tb} , 
= ~l , . . . ,Xc  = I~c ,  Xc+l  = tc+l , . . . ,X  l = t l}  , 
: ]"£1," • " ,  X¢ : ].Lc, Xc+ 1 : ]Zc+ I ,  " " " '  Xb  : I'Zb }" 
Note that the nice look of the above hyperplanes i due to the appropriate 
choice of a basis. If a different basis is chosen, they may have to be 
expressed by linear equations. 
To represent a Gaussian distribution across all the subhyperplanes on 
C* that are parallel to B*, we need to define a wide-sense inner product 
over C*. Since C* is not a subspace, we introduce the following operations 
on C*  : 
xey= (x - t )  + (y - t )  +t  for anyxandy  ~C* ,  
a ® x = a (x  - t) + t for any x in C* and any real number a.  
It is easy to verify that • and ® are closed operations on C*. According 
to Dempster (1969), the wide-sense inner product 7r, which is defined on B 
and takes the value 0 on C, has a dual operation ~*(x ,y ) ,  which is a 
wide-sense inner product on C* with the null hyperplane B* under the 
operations ~ and N. That is, ~*(x ,y )  = 0 iff x or y ~ B*, ~*(x ,y )  = 
~-*(y, x) for any x and y ~ C*, and 
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7r*[(o~ ® x)  • ( ~ ® y) , z ]  = o~*(x ,z )  + /37r* (y ,z )  
for any x, y, z E C* and real numbers c~ and /3. In coordinate terms, if ]£ 
is the covariance matrix as in Section 3.1, then for any x = (x~ . . . . .  x,,) and 
y = (yj . . . . .  y,,) in C*, 
7r* (x ,  y )  = (xc+ I - t, +l . . . . .  xt, - tb )~, - l (Y~ +l - t c - I  . . . . .  Yh - t~,) r .  
(7) 
So far we have found the duals for C, B, L, and 7r. In the following we 
need to derive a l inear functional on C*, which is dual to E and specifies 
the mean location E*. First we establish a one-to-one correspondence 
between l inear functionals on C* that are zero on the hyperplane B* and 
the hyperplanes on C* that are parallel to B*. 
LEMMA ] In  coord inate  terms,  H* (x )  is a l inear funct ion  on C* that  is 
zero on B* i f f  there exists a (b  - c ) -d imens iona l  vector  a such that  
H* (x )  =~]£  I (x~+l  - t ,+ l  . . . . .  x h - -  t l , )  T ,  (8) 
where x = ( #1 . . . . .  i~ c, x,  + 1 . . . . .  x, , )  ~ C*. 
Proof It suffices to prove the necessity. The linearity of H*(x)  implies 
that there exists an n-dimensional  vector z such that H*(x)  = zx r for any 
x = (/~l . . . . .  P~c, x,.~ 1 . . . . .  x,,) on C*. We decompose z into ( z l ,  z 2, z~) 
such that 
H*(x)  = zl( JL~ 1 . . . . .  #c  )T @- Z2(Xc+ 1 . . . . .  Xh )T -+- Z3(Xh+ I . . . . .  XH )T" 
Since H*(x)  = 0 for any x ~ B*, it follows that z 3 = 0 and 
z~( #j . . . . .  #~)T + z2(t~. + ~ . . . . .  t:,) r = O. 
Therefore, for any x ~ C*, 
H*(x)  = z2(x , ,  + i - tc + l . . . . .  x~, - tl,) r .  
Let a = z~ ~. Then (8) is proved. • 
Comparing (7) and (8), we see that, for any fixed x ° in C*, ~-*(x °, x) is a 
l inear functional on C* with null hyperplane B*. In general, 7r*(x °, x) is 
different when x ° changes over  C*. However, it is easy to see from (7) that 
~*(x  °, x )  is invariant iff x ° is in a hyperplane parallel to B*. That is, for 
each hyperplane H* that is parallel to B*, 
H*(x)  = 7r* (x° ,x )  for any x ° inH*  (9) 
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is a linear functional on C* that is zero on B*, and the choice of x ° does 
not matter. On the other hand, for each linear functional H*(x)  that is 
zero on B* and has the form (8), 
H* : {(P~I . . . . .  t~c,Xc+l . . . .  . . . . .  Xb) =a + (to+ 1 . . . . .  tb)} 
(10) 
is a hyperplane that is parallel to B*. Therefore, we have 
LEMMA 2 Through ~-*(x °, x), linear functionals that are zero on B* and 
hyperplanes that are parallel to B* are in a one-to-one correspondence 
carried out by (9) and (10). 
Note that E* is parallel to B*. As a corollary, the hyperplane E* and the 
linear functional E*(x )  = ~(x  °, x)  are one-to-one correspondent. There- 
fore, we can use E*(x )  as the dual to E and arrive at the representation 
(C*, t ,B*,L*, It*, E*)  for a marked GBF. We write t before B*, ~-*, and 
E* because all these objects depend on the choice of t. Intuitively, 
(C*, t, B*, L*, ~-*, E*)  expresses beliefs about which element of V* is the 
true configuration of V. We are certain that the true configuration is on 
the hyperplane C* (the certainty hyperplane). Within C*, our belief is 
distributed over ellipsoidal cylinders around a smaller-dimensional hyper- 
plane E* (the expectation hyperplane) parallel to B*. The wide-sense inner 
product 7r* (the concentration inner product) specifies the shape, scale, 
and direction of the ellipsoidal cylinders, and the linear functional E* (the 
location functional) specifies E* by giving its inner product with every 
other hyperplane parallel to B* within C*. We call B* the no-opinion-ex- 
pressed space, since the GBF does not express any opinions about where 
the true configuration is along its coordinates. Similarly, we call I* the 
no-opinion-allowed hyperplane, since the GBF, so long as it has the label 
L, is not allowed to express any opinions about where the true configura- 
tion is along its coordinates. 
EXAMPLE 2 Consider the GBF described in Example 1. If we choose 
X, Y, Z as a basis for V, then each linear functional on V can be repre- 
sented by a sample point (x ,y , z )  and V* = ( (x ,y , z )  lx, y , z  ~ ~}. Let 
t = (t~, t2, t3). Since t agrees with E on C, 
t (X+ Y+Z)  = (t~,t z, t3)(1,1,1) T=t  I +tz  + t 3 =E(X+ Y+Z)  = 1. 
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Thus, t is a point on the hyperplane x + y + z = 1. Note that C is spanned 
by X+ Y+Z,  B is spanned by X+ Y+Z and X+ Y, and L=V.  
Obviously, L* = {t}. The hyperplanes C*, B*, and E* are as follows: 
C* = {(x ,y ,z ) l z+y  +z = 1}, 
B* = {(x ,y ,z ) lx  + y + z = 1, x + y =t  I + t2}, 
E* = {(x ,y ,z ) lx+y +z = 1, x+y = 0.5}. 
F igure 1 shows these hyperplanes graphically. The GBF  has no opinion 
about the true sample value along the dimension of solid lines in F igure 1. 
It has a Gaussian distr ibution on the hyperplane C*, which describes how 
likely it is that the true value lies on a line that is paral lel  to E* and B*. 
Unfortunately,  the distr ibution cannot be written explicitly in the current 
coordinate system. We choose U=X+ Y+Z,  V=X+ Y, W=X as 
another  basis for V. Let V* = {(u, t.,, w) I u, L~, w ~ N} and t = (1, t 2, t3). 
Then, C* = {(u, L', w) [ u = 1}, B* = {(u, l.~, w) ] u = 1, L' = t2},  and C* = 
{(u, L', w) ]u = 1, t~ = 0.5}. 7r* and E* are as follows: 
7r*[(1, L,',w'), (1, L',w)] = l ( t : '  - t2)(t, - t2), 
AZ 
E ~ 
B* 
y 
E*(1 ,  t ' ,w)  = 12(0.5 - t2)(t'- t2 ) .  
Figure 1. The graphical representation of C*, B*, and E* in the (x, y, z) coordi- 
nate system. 
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Figure 2. The graphical representation f C*, B*, and E* in the (u, u, w) coordi- 
nate system. 
Based on the new coordinate system, the GBF is graphically shown in 
Figure 2. 
4. COMBIN ING GAUSSIAN BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
In this section we adapt Dempster's rule (2) to the case of GBFs. We 
achieve this progressively. We first define the combination for special cases 
and gradually generalize it into the full generality. As can be seen easily in 
Section 3.1, after we choose an appropriate basis for a variable space, each 
GBF consists of a Bayesian belief function for some variables and a 
vacuous belief function for others. Since the vacuous components do not 
contribute to knowledge, the combination of two GBFs is essentially the 
combination of their corresponding Bayesian components. Therefore, we 
can treat the combination of GBFs as a special case of the combination of 
continuous Bayesian belief functions. Following this logic, we first derive a 
rule for combining GBFs in a variable space. The resulting rule depends 
on the choice of an appropriate basis in the variable space. At this time, 
we are not aware of whether it can be represented in a coordinate-free 
way. In contrast with marginalization, combination can be most naturally 
described in a sample space. As Dempster (1990a, b) suggested, combina- 
tion in a sample space can be phrased in coordinate-free t rms as intersec- 
tions of hyperplanes and additions of wide-sense inner products. In the 
second part of this section, we formally represent Dempster's uggested 
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rule and show its consistency with the corresponding rule in a variable 
space. 
4.1. Combination by Dempster's Rule 
Given any continuous random vector X, a Bayesian belief function for it 
has singleton focal elements {x}. Its basic probability assignment can be 
represented by a function, say f(x), which specifies the belief density 
committed to assertion {x}. Now suppose fl(x) and f2(x) correspond to 
two Bayesian belief functions for X. Let {x} and {x'} denote their focal 
elements, respectively. Since {x} ¢1 {x'} = ~ if x :~ x', the elements {x} 
and {x'} are consistent assertions only if x = x'. Discarding the belief 
committed to Q, the total belief committed to all the possible joint 
assertions is ffi(x)f2(x)dx. The total belief committed to the joint asser- 
tion X ~ (x, x + Ax) is f~+ ±Xfl(x)f2(x) dx. Therefore, the density func- 
tion for the combined belief function, denoted by f~(x)® fz(X), is as 
follows by Dempster's rule: 
f l(x) ®f2(x)  = o~ lf l(x)f2(x) , (11) 
where a = ffl(x)f2(x)dx. Note that fl(x) ® f2(x) >_ 0 and ~fl(x) ® 
f2(x) dx = 1. Thus, fj(x) ® f2(x) is indeed a probability density function. 
In the special case when fl(x) and f2(x) are Gaussian, we can represent 
fl(x) ® f2(x) explicitly. Let d(x, ~, Ix) denote an n-dimensional Gaussian 
density function with mean Ix and covariance matrix ~ as follows: 
1 
d[x, I£, IX] = ( ) IX127r  - ' /2 -1 /z  exp{-½(x  - IX)X l(x - -  IX)T}, (12) 
where I~l is  the determinant of N. Then, we have 
LEMMA 3 Let fl(x) = d(x, ~l, IXJ) and f2(x) = d(x, Z2, Ix?). Then fl(x ) 
® f2(x) = d(x, (r, a), where 
or= [(X 1) 1+ (2£2) 1] 1 and 
a = [ IXl (Xl) - I  -L IX2(X2) -1] [ ( ]~1)1 q - (X2) -1] 1 (13) 
Proof According to (12), we can verify that 
1 ( (x -a )o -  L (x - -a ) r -R )  
f l(x)f2(x) = (277.)n]~1~2]1/2 exp -- 2 ' 
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where a and o- are expressed in (13) and 
R = ao-  laT  - -  /.~I(~I)-I(].LI)T -- /J~2(~2)-I(I, z2)T 
= ]d,l(~¢l ) 1[(,~.1 ) 1 -i t- (~2) -1 ]  -](W.,1)-I(/./., I)T 
_1_ /.£2(~__2) 1[(.~,) ,.jr_ (~2)-1] 1(~2) I(/j2)T 
+ 2#L(.~1) 1[ (~, ) -1  + (~£2)-1]-1(~2)-1( /~2)T 
_ /X1(~1 ) 1( /Xl)r _ /.L2(£2) 1( jt/2)T. 
It follows from 
[(~1)-1 q_ (~2)1]  1 
= .~,2 _ ~£2[~1 q_ £2] 1~2 
that R can be simplified as 
R = _ (#L  _ /x2)[Wl + ~2] -1 
Therefore, 
fl(x)f2(x) 
Note that 
1 
(2rr)"12~l 2~211/2 
( ~1 __ ~2) T. 
(x_a)or_l(x_a)r +(ial t22)[~1 +~21_1 
× exp -- 2 
Thus, 
111 
( i.t t - ~2) r ) 
(~I  .{._ "~2) 1 (~1)-1[( ,~1) 1 ]_ (y2)  1] 1 
= ( :~2)- I .  
]~1 + ~2] 1/2]~1~2]1/2 = ](~l) 1 q- (,~2)-11 1/2 
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Therefore, 
f l (x ) f2 (x )  = 
Therefore, 
1 
1/2 
(2,n-)n/2 [(~ l ) 1-L(.~_~2) 1] ' 
(' ) Xexp - -~(x -  a)[(~, 1) 1 + (]~2) 1]( x _a)  T 
1 
X (2,.rr)n/2]~ 1 + ~,211/2 
Xexp{I(I_LI _ /&2)(~l _}_ ~2) l(/ j l  _ /~2)T}. 
f f,(x)f2(x) dx = 
and according to (13) 
fl(X) ® f2(x) = 
1 
(27r)"/~1~ l + ~211/2 
×exp{½(/x 1 -  ~U~2)(~I -} - "~2) 1( ]& l  jO2)'l'}. 
(2,.n.),z/2 [ ( .~ l )1+(~2) l ]  1 1 
/2 
×exp{- l (x -  a ) [ (~2 ' )L+ (~22) 1]( x _ a)r}.  • 
Now we define the combination of two continuous Bayesian belief 
functions bearing on different sets of variables. Suppose f~(x 1, x 2) is the 
density function for random variable sets X l and X 2, and fz(xl, x~) for X l 
and X~, where X z and X 3 are disjoint. Their focal elements are single- 
tons, denoted by {(x I, x2)} and {(x'~, x3)}, respectively. By (3), 
{(x l ,x2)} lx~ C~ {(x'l,x~)} "x' ~ 0 iff Y 1 =Xr l  . 
Discarding the belief committed to 0 ,  the total belief committed to all the 
possible joint assertions is o~ = f f  l(xl, x2)f2(Xl, x~) dx I dx 2 dx~. Therefore, 
the density function for X~, X 2, and X 3 in the combined belief function, 
denoted by f l (x l ,  x 2) ® f2(xl, x3), is as follows by Dempster's rule: 
f j (x j ,x  2) ® f2 (x l ,xO = ot I f l (x l ,x2) f2 (x t ,x3) .  (14) 
Theory of Gaussian Belief Functions 113 
Since fl(xl, X 2) = fl(Xl)fl(X 2 IX  1 = x 1) and f2 (x l ,  X 3) = f2(x1)f2(x3 IX1 = 
xl), we can verify that a = f f l (xl)f2(xl)d.~c 1. Then, according to (11), we 
have 
f l (x l ,  x2) ® f2(xl, X3) = {f l (x l )  ® f2(xt )}f l (x2]  X l  = x~)fE(x3l X~ = x~). 
(15) 
In words, the combined density function is the product of the combination 
of the marginal density functions on the common variables and the 
conditional density functions given the value of the common variables. It is 
interesting to note that (15) indicates the conditional independence be- 
tween X 2 and X 3 given X~. As a basic property, marginals and condition- 
als of a Gaussian distribution are still Gaussian. Thus, according to 
Lemma 3, f l(xl) ® f2(x 1) is Gaussian, and so is fl(xl, x 2) ® f2(xl, x 3) by 
(15) if fl(xl, x 2) and f2(xl, x 3) are both Gaussian. 
LEMMA 4 Assume f l( x l, x 2) andf2(xl, x 3) are Gaussian. Assume 
f l(xl  ) ® f2(xl ) = d(Xl, o-1, a 1 ), (16) 
fl(x2lXl = Xl )  = d[x2, ov2,a  2 Jr- Xl(b2)T], (17) 
f2(x3]Xl= x 1) : d[x3, 0.3,a3 + Xl(b3)T]. (18)  
Then 
f l (Xl ,  x2) ® f2(xl ,  x3) 
= d[ (x , ,Xz ,X . , ) ,~ , (a~,a2  + a , (b2) r ,a3  + a l (b3) r ) ] ,  
where 
0.1 °'l(b2 )7" °'l(b3 )T 
b20-1 0" 2 + b20"1(b2 )T b20"1(b3 )T 
/ b30.1 b30.1(b2) T 0.3 + b30.1(b3) T 
Proof  Assume n~, n2, and n 3 are respectively the dimension numbers 
of X~, X2, and X 3. According to (15)-(18), we can verify that 
1 
f l(Xl,X2) ® f2(Xl,X3) (2Yr)(nl+n2+ns)/2(lO'l[ × 10.2] × 10.31) /2 
× exp{ - 1 ~g(xl,x2,x3)}, 
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where 
g(Xl,X2,X3) = (X  1 - -  al)(o.1) I (X  1 - -  al )T 
q- [x  2 - -a  2 --Xl(b2)T](o.2 ) I[X 2 - -a  2 -x (b2) r ]  T 
+[x  3 -a  3-x~(b3)r ] (o .3)  ' [x  3 -a  3 -x , (b3) r ]  r 
By (15), fl(Xl,X2)@f2(xI,X3) IS Gaussian and its marginal on X~ is 
fL(xl) ® f2(xl). Thus, E(X  1) = a 1. Furthermore, by (17), we have E(X  2) = 
E[E(X2 JX I ) ]  = E[a 2 + Xl(b2 )r] = a 2 + a l (b2  )r. Similarly, we have E(X  3) 
= a 3 + al(b3) r. Therefore, there exist a three-dimensional symmetric ma- 
trix (wij) such that 
T 
g(X l ,  X2, X 3) = (X  1 al, x2 -- a 2 -- aa(b2 )r,  x 3 - a 3 - al(b3) )(wi j)  
T f 
×(x ,  - , , , ,  x2  - ~,, - a l (b2)T ,  x3 - a3  - , ' l (b~)  ) . 
By matching the coefficients of xix j (i, j = 1, 2, 3), we can show that 
WII  = (O .1)  1 -~- (b2)T(O.3). l b  2 -/- (b3)T (o .3 ) .  . 1 b3  ' 
w12 (b2)r(o.~) 1 = __(b3)T(O.3) I = __ - , W13 . . , W22 = (0 .2 )  1 
w23 = 0, and w33 = (o .3) l  
Therefore, 
(wij) = 
I - (b2  )r - (b3)  r ) 
0 I 0 
0 0 I 
(o.1) I 0 0 
0 (o.2) I 0 
0 {} (o.3) 
1 0 
× -b2 1 
-b  3 0 
I 0 0 
(wij) l=  b e 1 0 
b 3 0 I 
!}, 
o.1 
0 
0 
0 0 
o- 2 0 
0 o- 3 
i (b2)r (b3)~' 
1 0 
0 I 
= ~,  
and Inl  : Io.ll x Io.2] x Io.31. • 
Finally we extend Dempster's rule to the general case when two continu- 
ous belief functions contain deterministic variables, whose value is known 
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with certainty. Wi thout  loss of generality, we assume that two bel ief  
functions Bel t and Bel 2 share a common determinist ic  vector D t and a 
common random vector X~. The vector U is determinist ic  in Bel t but 
uncertain in Bel 2, and V vice versa. Bel 1 is certain about O 2 and 
uncertain about X 2. However,  Bel 2 has no opinion about either D 2 or  X 2. 
Similarly, Bel 2 is certain about D 3 and uncertain about X 3, but Bel 1 has 
no opinion about either D 3 or X 3. In summary, Bel 1 bears on determinis-  
tic vectors D~, D 2, U and random vectors V, Xt,  X 2, and Bel 2 on deter-  
ministic vectors D 1, D3, V and random vectors U, Xj ,  X 3. The hypergraph 
represent ing Bel~ and Bel 2 is shown in F igure 3. Since D t is a common 
determinist ic  vector, its value must be the same in both Bel t and Bel 2, 
because otherwise there are no possible joint assertions. Let D~ = d~ in 
both Bel 1 and Bel 2. Assume O 2 = d2 ,  U = u and D 3 = d 3, V = v with 
certainty in Bel t and Bel2, respectively. Then focal e lements for Bel t can 
be represented by (dl ,  d2,  u ,  to', X l ,  x2)  , and for Bel 2 by (dl ,  d 3, u', v, x'l, x3). 
Each pair of focal e lements is nonconfl ict ing iff u = u ' ,  to = to', and 
x t = x' 1. Therefore,  for the existence of possible joint assertions, U is 
restr icted to take values u in Bel 2 and V is restr icted to take values to in 
Bell .  Consequently,  in the combined bel ief  function Bel t ® Bel2, U and V 
become determinist ic  and 
D 1 = d 1 , D 2 = d 2 , D 3 = d 3, U = u, V = v. (19) 
Let fl(to, x~, x 2) and f2(u,  x 1, x 3) be respectively the density functions for 
Bel I and Bel 2. Then the total bel ief  committed to all the possible joint 
assertions is 
a = f f l ( to ,  x l ,  x2) f2 (u ,  X 1 , X 3) dx 1 dy 2 dx 3. 
Therefore,  the bel ief  density for Xl ,  X2, and X 3 in Bel l  ® Bel 2 is 
f l (U ,X l ,X  2) ® f2 (b l ,X l ,X  3) = O~ I f I (U ,X1 ,X2) f2 (u ,X I ,X3) .  (20) 
Figure 3. The belief network for Bel 1 and Bel 2. 
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Since f,(t, ,  x 1, x 2) = f l (v ) f , (x l ,  x 2 j V = c) and f2(u, xl ,  x 3) = 
f2(u)f2(xl ,  x 3 I U = u), applying (15) and (20) leads to 
f l (v ,x l ,x2)  ® f2 (u ,xL ,  x3) 
= [ f l (x l lV= L~) ®fE(Xl lU = u)] 
f l (x2[V = t~, g t = x l ) f2(x3lU = u, X] = xl) .  (21) 
Given two GBFs Bel~ = (Ct ,B I , L , ,T r ' ,E  1) and Bel 2 = (C2 ,B2 ,L2 ,  
"n "2, E2), in the following we will use (21) and Lemmas 3 and 4 to obtain 
their combinat ion 
Bel = Bell ® Bel 2 = (C ,B ,L ,  ~-, E) .  
It can be seen easily from Dempster's rule that C = C 1 • C 2, B = B] • B 2, 
and L = L 1 • L 2. However, at this time we are not able to represent E 
and ~- in a coordinate-free way. Instead we choose a convenient basis 
D~, D 2, D 3, U, V, X~, X 2, X 3 . . . .  such that C~ is spanned by {D 1, D 2, U}, 
C 2 by {D k, D 3, V}, B l by {D l, D 2, U, V, X l, X2}, and B 2 by 
{D l, D 3, V, U, X 1, X3}. There might be some other variables in L~ • L 2 
that are not in B~ • B 2. However, specifying them is not necessary, 
because E and ~- are defined in B l • B 2. As we know, when a basis is 
chosen, 7r i and E i (i = 1,2) are specified by the corresponding mean 
vectors and covariance matrices. The following theorem then shows how 
the mean vector for E and the covariance matrix for ~- can be represented 
by them. 
THEOREM 1 Git,en any two GBFs 
Belj = (C i ,Br ,L l ,  Jr 1, EJ), where C 1 is spanned by {DI, D2, U} and B I 
by {D], D2, U, V, X l, X2}, E 1 is determined by the mean vector 
(dl, d2, u, ILl), IZ~l, t~ ), and ~r 1 is determined by the cot,ariance matrix 
Z]j (i, j = 0, 1, 2), and 
Bel z = (C2 ,Bz ,Lz ,~-2 ,  E2),  where C 2 is spanned by (D I ,D3 ,  V}, B 2 by 
{D1, D3, V, U, X l, X3}, E 2 is determined by the mean t:ector 
(d,, d3, t~, i~2, tz~, ~) ,  and 7r 2 is determined by the covariance matrix 
Z~j (i, j = 0, 1, 3), 
their combination Bel ~ ® Bel 2 is the GBF 
Bel = (C, B, L, ~-, E )  
where C = C 1 • C2, B = B 1 • B2, L = L 1 @ L2, E is determined by the 
mean vector 
(d], d 2, d 3, u, v, ax, a 2 + at(b2 )T, a 3 + al(b3)T),  (22) 
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and rr is determined by the covariance matrix 
f~ = 
001 °'1(b2 )r  001(bs )r  
b2001 0"2 + b2001(b2) T b2001(b3) T 
~b3o- 1 b3Ol(b2 )T 0" 3 + b3o-i(b3 )T 
(23) 
where 
0"1 = [(Xl  ) 1 + (~.,2) 1 ] -1  
al = [ /x i (X l )  1+ /.L2(~2~2) I ] [ (x l ) - I  + (X2) 1] 1 
i i 1 i '~i ~ill -- ~'Io(~'oo ) ~'oI (i = 1,2),  
- p .o ) (Xoo)  X l , ,  
--  ) (~ '00  ) ~'*01' 
/./,2 = ~ + (U ]Z 2 2 1 2 
002 = x~2 - (x~,,, x'~)  I,0  I,,t '1 I,2/ 
xlI(' X1111 1 xll2 ) '  
a2 + Xl(b2 )T I = ~2 + (~ ' -  ~I>, x, - / , )  
xl),, xl),) 
Xl0 Xll 
1 
XI2 ' 
(24) 
, (25)  
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
X(20 XO1 X23 
a 3 +x , (b3)  T=l~ + (u -  1.2.x1 - ~)  X~,, 2£~, 2£~3 " 
(31) 
(32) 
Proof  From (19) it is easy to see that {D~, D 2, D 3, U, V} spans C. Thus, 
C = C 1 • C 2. According to (21), Bel has opinions about X I, X 2, and X 3. 
Therefore,  B is spanned by {Dj, D2, D 3, U, V, Xl, X 2, X3}. Hence we have 
B = B~ • B 2. That L = L 1 • L 2 is obvious from Dempster 's  rule (2). It is 
a standard property of Gaussian distributions that f t (x~[V  = v)= 
d(xt  ' Z l, ttl) and f2(xt  q U = u) = d(x  I, X2, p Z),wher e 1£i and/x  i (i = 1,2) 
are shown in (26)-(28). By Lemma 3, 
fL(x l ]V = V) ® f2(x l ]U = U) = d(x  1, 001,al). 
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By (29)-(32), it is also standard that 
f l(X2[V= u ,X  1 =y l )= d(x2,0"2,a 2 q-Xl(b2)T), 
f2(x3[g = lg,X 1 = x1)  = d(x3, or3 ,a  3 -~- Xl(b3)T). 
According to (21) and Lemma 4, 
f l ( l~' ,X l ,X2)  ® f2 (u ,X l ,X3)  
where f~ is shown by (22). • 
In (26)-(32), ~;~ and /x 1 are respectively the conditional variance and 
mean of X 1 given V = t: in f l (v ,  x~, x2); I£ 2 and /x 2 are respectively the 
conditional variance and mean of XI given U = u in f2(u,  x l, x3); a 2 and 
b 2 are the regression coefficients of X 2 against X 1 in f~(x l, x 2 ] V = t,); a 3 
and b3 are the regression coefficients of X 3 against X~ in f2(x~, x 3 ] U = 
u). In words, the combination of two GBFs is done by the following 
four-step rocedure: 
1. The certainty space of the combined GBF is the orthogonal sum of 
the certainty spaces of the component GBFs: A piece of evidence 
that supports a certainty space will be adopted as a fact in combina- 
tion. If a variable is believed to take a value with certainty by one 
component GBF, it is believed so by the combined GBF no matter 
how another component GBF feels about the variable. 
2. The belief space of the combined GBF is the orthogonal sum of the 
belief spaces of the component GBFs: The beliefs expressed by any 
component GBF will not be lost in the combination. If one compo- 
nent GBF has opinions about a certain variable, the combined GBF 
will adopt and somehow revise the opinions in accordance with 
another component GBF. 
3. Suppose F1, F 2, and F are respectively the uncertainty spaces of Bel~, 
Bel 2, and Bel. Given the basis of C, compute the conditional means 
and variances for the basis of F~ • F 2 in both distributions, the 
regression coefficients of the basis of F1 - F 1 f"l F 2 against the basis 
of F 1 C~ F2, and the regression coefficients of the basis of F 2 - F 1 n F 2 
against he basis of F1 c~ F 2 in the appropriate distribution. 
4. Plug the results obtained in step 3 into (22)-(25), and get E and ~-. 
Steps 1 and 2 imply that combination corresponds to knowledge integra- 
tion. Steps 3 and 4 imply that the complex formulas of combination have 
some statistical semantics. 
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EXAMPLE 3 Let Bel~ denote the GBF specified in Example 1. Let Bel 2 be 
another GBF bearing on random variables X, Y, and Z, which represents 
the following statistical models: 
Z = 1 .5X+ 0.3 + e z, 
Y = 0.5Z + 0.1 + ey,  
(33) 
(34) 
where X ~ N(0.2, 0•04), e z ~ N(0, 2), and ey ~ N(0, 1) are independent• 
The belief-network representation of the above model is shown in Figure 
4. Using (12), Equations (33) and (34) can be also respectively represented 
by f ( z  IX = x) = d(z, 2, 1.5x + 0.3) and f (y  ] Z = z) = d(y, 1, 0.5z + 0•1). 
Noting that Y is conditionally independent of X given Z, the joint density 
function f (x,  y, z) can be obtained by multiplying f (x )  with f (z  IX = x) 
and f (y  ]Z = z). We can also obtain f (x ,  y, z) directly from (33) and (34) 
by computing the means and the covariances of X, Y, and Z. For example, 
E[Z]  = 1 .5E[X]  + 0.3 = 0.6, E[Y]  = 0 .5E[Z]  + 0.1 = 0.4, 
Coy(Y, Z)  = Cov(0.5Z + 0.1 + er ,  Z)  = Cov[0.5(1.5X+ 0.3 + e z) + 
0.1 + ey, 1.5X + 0.3 + e z] = 1.125 Var(X)  + 0•5 Var(e z) = 1.045, etc. 
The joint density function for Bel 2 is 
[ ,000 °°4° 000 000465 t ] o4, 
• 1•045 2•090] 
Let us choose a common basis U=X+ Y+Z,  V=X+ Y ,W=X for 
both Belj and Bel 2. Then Bel 2 is represented by the distribution 
f (u ,c ,w)  = d[(u , / ' ,  W),  
5.923 2.728 0.130) ] 
2.728 1.693 0.07 , (1.2, 0.6, 0.2) . 
0.130 0.070 0.040 
According to Theorem 1, C is spanned by U and B is spanned by {U, V, W}. 
The common uncertain variable for both Bel I and Bel 2 is V, which is like 
X~ in Theorem 1. Given U = 1, the conditional of V in Bel~ is the 
distribution of V itself, d(L,, 2, 0.5). Thus, I£ l = 2 and p l = 0.5. Since V is 
the only uncertain variable V in Bel t, terms including a 2 + u(b2 )r and o- 2 
in Theorem 1 do not exist• Given U = 1, the conditional distribution of V 
Cr--C Q 
Figure 4. The belief network for Equations (33) and (34). 
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in Bel 2 is d(v, 0.436, 0.508). Thus, ]£2 = 0.436 and /z 2 = 0.508. Similarly, 
according to (31) and (32), we have 
2.728 1.693 0.07] =0.037 ,  
a 3 + u(b3) r = 0 .2+ (1 - 1.2, t . . . .  0.6)( 5.923 2.728] ' /0 .13]  
2.728 1.693 ] ~ 0.07 ] 
= 0.184 + 0.023t~. 
Thus, a s = 0.184 and b 3 = 0.023. By (24) and (25) we have o- 1 = 0.358 and 
a 1 = 0.507. Plugging the above values into (22) and (23), we obtain the 
combined mean vector for U, V, and W as (1,0.507,0.196), and the 
combined covariance matrix for V and W is 
(0 .3580.008)  
0.008 0.037 " 
4.2. A Coordinate-Free Representation of Combination 
The rule for combining GBFs in Section 4.1 depends on the choice of a 
coordinate system. In this section, we want to represent it alternatively in a 
coordinate-free way. The new representation turns out to be elegant and 
concise. It also helps us see the deep symmetry, i.e., commutativity and 
associativity, of  combination. However, it does not imply any improvement 
of computational efficiencies. For the purpose of numerical computation, 
Liu (1995a, b) provides a third equivalent representation of the combina- 
tion rule in terms of partial or full sweep operations, which essentially 
reduce combination of GBFs into spreadsheet manipulations. 
THEOREM 2 Suppose Bel I and Bel 2 are two marked GBFs  represented 
in a sample space: 
Belj = (C* I , t ,B* I , L* I ,~-* I ,E* I ) ,  
Bel 2 = (C  .2  , t ,  B .2 ,  L .2 ,  71 .2  , E*2) ,  
where t is their common mark.  Then 
Bel I • Bel 2 = (C*, t ,B* ,L* ,  ~-*, E*)  
= (C .1 N C*2 , t ,B  .1 N B*2,L *l N L*2, ~-*l lc,,nc,2 
+ ~'*2lc*ln c .2 , E* l lc*~ n c *-~ + E*21c*' ~ c*:), 
where ~*  i l c *~ ~ c*: and E* i l c*' ~ c *~ are respectively the restrictions o f  ~*  i 
andE  *i (i = 1,2) to the intersection C .1 n C .2. 
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Proof  We prove Theorem 2 using Theorem 1. Thus, we assume Bel~ 
and Bel 2 are the dual representat ions of the two GBFs  (C1,B 1, L : ,  ~-1, E ~) 
and (C2 ,B2 ,L  2, ~.2, E2), as def ined in Theorem 1, whose combinat ion in 
(C, B, L, ~-, E )  where C = C 1 • C 2, B = B l • B z, L = L l • L2, and E 
and ~r are specified by (22) and (23). We want to show (C* , t ,B* ,L* ,  
~'*, E* )  is dual to (C, B, L, ~r, E )w i th  the mark t. 
Given any l inear functional t, suppose hyperplanes S* and T*, def ined 
as in (6), are dual to subspaces S and T, respectively. Then, according to 
Dempster  (1969), S* ~ T* is the hyperplane dual to the subspace S • T. 
Therefore,  given t as a common mark, it is easy to see from Theorem 1 
that C* = C *~ ~ C .2, B* = B *~ ~B .2, and L* = L *~ ~L  .2. Using the 
basis and the values of its determinist ic  variables specified in Theorem 1, 
the common mark t satisfies 
t (D  1) = d 1, t (D  2) = d : ,  t (D3)  = d3,  t (U)  = u ,  t (V )  = t~. 
Therefore,  t can be written as point (d~, d 2, d 3, u, L,, t~, t: ,  t 3 . . . .  ) in the 
sample space, where t i is the value assigned to X i by t, i = 1,2,3. 
Accordingly,  C* and B* can be represented as follows: 
C = C .1 ~ C .2 = {(d l ,d2 ,d3 ,u , t , ,x l ,x2 ,x  ~ . . . .  )}, 
B = B *l N B .2 = ( (d t ,d2 ,d3 ,u , t , , t l , t2 , t  3 . . . .  ) ) .  
For  any x =(d l ,dz ,d3 ,  u , t , ,x l ,  x2 ,x  3 . . . .  ) and x '=(d l ,d2 ,d3 ,  u, l~,x'  l, 
! t x 2, x 3 . . . .  ) in C*, 
~, ' (~,  ~,) = ( , , -  ~,,x, - , , ,~  - t:)(~]~) ' (~, -  ~,, x', - ,,,x~ - ¢2) ~ 
= (x  I - t  t ,x : - t2 )G(x '  1 - t  1 ,x~- t2)  r ,  
.~ 1 
1r*2(x ,x ' )  = (u  - u ,x ,  - t , , x  3 - t3 ) (x ; j  ) (u  - u ,x ' ,  - t l , x~ - t3) r 
= (x t - t  l , x  3 - t .OH(x '  1 - t  l , x~- t3)  r ,  
where 
G = 
H = 
[ (zcl~ ) ]1 __ ( --1 1 
]1 
__ 1 2 "~ 
~3 :~,, (~ , , )  (~,,~, zc~. 0 . 
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By some tedious computation we can verify that 
c = w-’ + th2)7b2) ‘b* -(h2)7(cT2)-’ I -(CT*)-‘b, ( CT* 1~ ’ I; 
H = w-’ + W7bJ ‘6, -(b,)7(cT1)-1 
i 
I 
-(a,) h, I (a,>-’ ’ 
where 2’ (i = 1,2), a,, a,, and b, (i = 2,3) are listed in (26) and (29)-(32). 
Therefore. 
Tr*‘(x, x’) + ‘rr*‘(x, x’) 
= (x, - f’,X, - t*,xj ~ t,)fL ‘(x’, - t’, x; - t*, x; - t,)‘, 
where R is listed in (23). According to Theorem 1, T*’ + T* *, when 
restricted to C*, is indeed r*. Finally, for any point x = (d,, d?, d,, U, I?, 
xl,xz,xj ,... )in C”, 
E”‘(x) = (PI, - [‘, #LL; - f,, /L: - tz)(Cf,) % - 1%,X, - t,,x, - tZ)7 
= [( 4, - P)Q + (/.L\ - r,,p; - qG](x, ~ l,,X? - q7, 
E**(x) = (#ui - U, & ~ t’, /L: - t&q+ - U,X, - l,,X, - t?)7 
= [(~~-u)R+(~~-tl,~L;--~)]H(xl --,,x,-t3J7, 
where G and H are as above, and Q and R are as follows: 
Q = -(X2,,,) ‘(&‘,,, C;,,)G, R = -(X;,,,m’(2:;,,X,:,,H. 
E*‘(x) + E*‘(x) is obviously a linear functional on C* with null hyper- 
plane B*. We can determine the location of its corresponding hyperplane 
that is parallel to BY by (8) and (10) with C replaced by 0 in (8). By some 
straightforward but tedious computation, we can verify that the location is 
the point (a,, uz + aI(h a3 + u,(h,)” ), which, according to Theorem 1, 
is the mean vector for X,, X2, and X, in the combined GBF. Therefore, 
E*‘(X) + E*2(x) = E*(x) when x is in C”. H 
Note that Theorem 2 is intuitive. As we see from Section 3.2, all the 
focal elements of Bel, are the hyperplanes that are on C”’ and parallel to 
B *‘, i = 1,2. Therefore, by Dempster’s rule, B*’ n B*’ is a typical focal 
element for the combined belief function. Its associated basic probability 
assignment is obtained by multiplying the basic probabilities assigned to 
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B .1 and B .2 and an appropr ia te  normal i za t ion  constant .  Thus,  the log 
"dens i ty"  of  the combined  GBF is the sum of the component  log "dens i -  
t ies." There fore ,  7r* = ~.,1 i c , ,~c , :  + 7r,2 ic ,~nc,_  " makes  sense. 
EXAMPLE 4 Let  Bel 1 be the GBF  speci f ied in Example  2, and Bel  2 be 
dual  to the Bel 2 speci f ied in Example  3. As  in Examples  2 and 3, we 
choose  U ,V ,W as a basis. Since t(U) = 1, let the common mark  t = 
(1,0.3,2) .  Then  C .1 = {(1, c,w)}, B .1 = {(1,0.3,w)}, L .1 = {(1,0.3,2)}, and 
for any two po ints  (1, c, w) and (1, t,', w')  in C *1, we have ~-'1[(1, v', w'), 
(1, l,, w)] = ' 5 ( t  - 0.3)(c - 0.3) and E*l(1, t,,w) = ½(0.5 - 0.3)(~ - 0.3). 
No var iab le  in Bel 2 is certa in  or vacuous.  Thus,  C .2 = {(u, t,,w)}, B .2 = 
{(1,0.3,2)}, and L .2 = {(1,0.3,2)}. Let  
0 .1301- '  ( -0 .305  ) 
~= 2 .7281.6930.07  | = -1 .0482.306 -0 .629  . 
0.040 ] 27.09 
5 .9232.728 
0.130 0.070 
Then,  for any two po ints  (u, t,, w) 
rr*2[(u',~,',w), (u,t,,w)] 
0.658 - 1.048 
- 0.305 - 0.629 
and (u',v',w') in C .2,  
E*2(u,v,w) 
= (u'  - 1,t , '  - 0.3, w' - 2) 
X f~(u  - 1,L, - 0 .3 ,w - 2) T, 
= (1.2 -- 1 ,0 .6  -- 0.3, 0.2 -- 2) 
X~(U -- 1,L~ -- 0.3, w -- 2) r .  
(t:' 0.3 ,w '  ~ , [0 .3580.008) -1 (u -0 .3 )  
= - - z ) [0 .008  0.037 w-  2 ' 
E* I (1 ,  t , ,w)  + E*2(1 ,  c ,w)  
= ½(0.5 - 0.3)(t ,  - 0.3) + (1.2 - 1 ,0 .6 - 0 .3 ,0 .2  - 2) 
×f l (1  - 1 ,L ,  - 0 .3 ,  w - 2) r 
= 1.714(t, - 0.3) - 49.011(w - 2) 
= (0.507 - 0 .3 ,0 .196 - z )~0.008 0.037 
There fore ,  accord ing  to Theorem 2, C* = C .1 n C .2  = {(1, t,, w)}, B* = 
B *l n B .2 = {(1,0.3,2)}, L* = L .1 C~ L .2  = {(1,0.3,2)}. For  any two po ints  
(1, t', w) and (1, L/, w')  in C*, 
rr*l[(1,t/,w'),(1,c,w)] + ~'*2[ (1 ,v ' ,w ' ) , (1 ,c ,w) ]  
= ½(L" - 0 .3) (v  - 0.3) + (1 - 1,c,' + 0 .3 ,w '  - 2) 
×f~(1  - 1 ,c  - 0 .3 ,  w - 2) T 
= ( l / -  0.3, w' - 2)(  _ 0.6292"806 -0.62927.09 ] l[UI w--0"3)2 
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Note that part of the above computation is to compare the results with 
those obtained in Example 3. If two GBFs are represented in a sample 
space, computing the inverse of a covariance matrix is unnecessary. There- 
fore, computing rr .1 + ~_,2 and E .1 + E .2 only involves multiplications 
of matrices or additions of quadratic and linear functions. After this is 
done, it is also unnecessary to transform the quadratic function form of 
~-*~ + ~r .2 and the linear function form of E *l + E .2 into their matrix 
product forms. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper emphasizes how the Dempster-Shafer theory of finite belief 
functions is extended to the case of GBFs, which are continuous and 
noncondensable. We first briefly introduced the basic notions of finite 
belief functions. We then described GBFs in terms of this basic concepts 
and gave the reader a geometric picture of GBFs. The combination of 
GBFs is defined by the standard procedure of intersecting focal elements 
and multiplying the component basic probabilities, except that a basic 
probability assignment for a finite belief function is replaced by a density- 
like function in a GBF. This treatment, we believe, will give the reader 
who has never exposed to Dempster-Shafer theory a self-contained e- 
scription of the GBF theory. It will also give a Dempster-Shafer theorist a 
link between finite belief function and GBFs. 
A GBF can be geometrically described as a Gaussian distribution across 
the members of a partition of a hyperplane into parallel subhyperplanes. It 
includes as special cases multivariate Gaussian distributions, linear equa- 
tions, and vacuous belief functions, which are nontrivial statistical models 
in both the classical and the Bayesian schools of thought. This paper 
formally represents a GBF by a wide-sense inner product and a linear 
functional over a variable subspace and by their duals over a hyperplane in 
a sample space. These abstract representations concisely show the full 
generality of GBFs. As illustrated by the examples in this paper as well as 
in Liu (1995a, b), in practical applications, many statistical and 
knowledge-based models turn out to be special GBFs and can be repre- 
sented by quadratic and linear functions or their corresponding matrix 
representations. Therefore, the abstract presentation of the theory of 
GBFs does not hinder its effective applications and efficient implementa- 
tion. 
Part of the reason for having the dual representations is that marginal- 
ization can be naturally described in a variable space and combination in a 
sample space. As we show, the combination of two GBFs in a variable 
space cannot be explicitly represented by component inner products and 
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linear functionals. The same is true for the marginalization of a GBF in a 
sample space. However, in applications we often have a predetermined set 
of variables of interest. In this case, with additional burden of conversion 
between covariance matrices and their inverses, both combination and 
marginalization can be easily done numerically in both a variable space 
and a sample space. 
The focal elements of a GBF in general are the subhyperplanes of a 
hyperplane. If an appropriate basis is chosen for a variable space, this 
feature essentially reduces a GBF to a Bayesian belief function for some 
basic variables. Therefore, the combination of GBFs can be derived from 
that for general Bayesian belief functions, which is the adaptation of 
Dempster's rule. We have employed this strategy in defining the combina- 
tion of GBFs in variable spaces. We could also adapt this strategy to derive 
the combination for non-Gaussian continuous belief functions such as t 
and exponent belief functions, if any. 
The rule for combining GBFs in a variable space is somewhat complex. 
However, it acts as a basis for more efficient or more concise representa- 
tions. In this paper, for example, it implies a coordinate-free representa- 
tion of combination, according to which the combined GBF is obtained by 
intersecting the component certainty hyperplanes and summing the com- 
ponent inner products and linear functionals over the intersection. This 
alternative representation is mathematically elegant but not computation- 
ally efficient. In Liu (1995a, b), a third representation of combination is 
obtained using full or partial sweepings. It essentially reduces the combi- 
nation of GBFs basic matrix operations, which can be done by a spread- 
sheet program. 
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